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Regulation J: How It Affects The
Collection of Checks and Other
Negotiable Instruments
By Robert Lorenzo Kline, III, Esq.

Overview
Although negotiable instruments may
be collected in a number of ways, a bank
must act in good faith, I and use ordinary
care2 throughout the collection process. If
a Federal Reserve Bank (Bank) is the collecting bank, it is subject to the provisions
of Federal Reserve Board Regulation J,
which preempts the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.).3 The provisions of Federal
Reserve Board Regulation J4 regarding the
collection of checks are binding on all
banks in the collection process of any item
that has been handled, presented, or forwarded by a bank. The bank, like a collecting bank under the U.c.c., acts only as an
agent in the collection of an item. s However, the Federal Reserve Bank is an agent of
only the sender of the item, unlike the collecting bank under the U.c.c., which is
the agent of the owner of the item.6
This article first examines and analyzes
Subpart A of Regulation J, which was promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board to
govern Federal Reserve Bank check clearing and the collection of negotiable instruments. Secondly, the article examines the
transfer of funds under Subpart B of Regulation J. Through a discussion of Subparts
A and B of Regulation J and the respective
operation of each subpart, this article will
explain the operation of the regulation and
note aspects that are different or which
conflict with U.c.c. §4, which also sets
forth the duties and responsibilities of the
collecting, depository and payor banks.

Check Clearing and Collection Under
the Federal Reserve System - Regulation
], Subpart A
The promulgation of Subpart A of Regulation J by the Federal Reserve Board was
designed to give the banking system a
direct, expeditious, and economical system
for the collection of checks. Subpart A sets
forth the terms and conditions under
which the Banks will receive checks for
collection from member banks or other
depositors, and present checks to paying
banks. The regulation also allows Banks to
issue operating circulars/ and procedures
for collecting checks. The regulation and
operating circulars are regarded as contracts between the Federal Reserve System,
its member banks and other depositors, 8
and, as specifically provided in U.c.c. § 4103, constitute agreements that can vary
the effects of U.c.c. provisions concerning bank deposits and collections.9
When a non-Federal Reserve Bank sends
a Bank a check, it authorizes the receiving
Federal Reserve Bank and all subsequent
collecting banks to handle the check in accordance with the provisions of Regulation J and the operating circulars of the
Bank. lo A sender also warrants its own
authority to give authorization, and agrees
that the provisions of Subpart A of Regulation J and the operating circulars, where
applicable, will govern the sender-bank
relationship with respect to the handling
of the check and its proceeds. II Each
sender also warrants, to each Bank that

handles the check, that it has good title to
the check and that the check has not been
materially altered. 12
The Bank will act as the agent of the
check sender until the time it has actually
received payment for the check, and has
made the proceeds available for use by the
sender .13 The Bank will not act as an agent
for an owner or holder of a check other
than the sender.14 When it presents or
sends for presentment and payment, or
forwards any check, the Bank warrants to
a subsequent collecting bank and the paying bank that it has good title to the check
or is authorized to collect it.
A paying bank becomes accountable for
the amount of each check received by it
from or through a Bank if it keeps the
checks after the close of the banking day
on which the check is received, unless it
pays or remits the check. IS Payment or remittance is acceptable in the form of (1) a
debit to an account on the books of the
Bank, (2) cash, or (3) any other form of
payment or remittance deemed acceptable
by the Bank. 16 Unless the Federal Reserve
Bank presents the check for immediate
payment over the counter, a paying bank
may revoke settlement before it has finally
paid the check if the paying bank returns
the check before midnight of the next
banking day following the banking day of
receipt. 17
If the Bank does not receive payment in
any of the stated forms, the amount of the
check may be 'charged back' to the sender,
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even if the check cannot be produced. 18
Should the Bank not actually receive payment and finally collect the funds of any
check for which it has given credit subject
to payment, the amount of the check will
also be 'charged back' to the sender, even
if the check cannot be returned. 19
Credit for checks presented for clearing
is made through entries to member bank
reserve accounts in accordance with a payment schedule which is published in the
various Federal Reserve Banks' operating
circulars. Immediate credit is given for all
qualified regional checks, and one or two
day deferred credit is given for checks payable at banks located in other Federal
Reserve Districts. Member banks using the
check clearing and collection system of the
Federal Reserve System have the option of
charging debits and credits arising from
check clearings to their own reserve account or to a member correspondent
bank's reserve account. Non-member
banks do not have the option, and must
charge their activity to a member correspondent bank's reserve account. 20
Since the time actually taken to collect a
check may be longer than that provided
for in the deferred payment schedule, the
crediting of the sender's account often occurs before the account of the drawee bank
is debited. This amount of credit, representing checks not yet collected but for
which credit has been given to the accounts of depositing banks is called
"float." Because the extension of Federal
Reserve credit through float has a random
effect on the availability of reserves, it
hampers the measurement of the money
supply. Therefore, Federal Reserve System
operations are geared to holding the float
to the lowest possible level by speeding up
the check settlement process. In order to
handle items more quickly the banks have
developed Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR), which is preprinted on
each check. Another method used by the
Federal Reserve Board is High Dollar
Group Sort (HDGS), which enables the
.collecting bank to deposit checks drawn
on a limited, preselected group of payor institutions.
Those checks that are not handled by the
Federal Reserve System are cleared by
local clearinghouse associations, by large
correspondent banks, or by direct exchange. However, most of the checks
cleared in the nation enter directly or indirectly into the Federal Reserve ClearingSystem after "on US"21 and locally clearing
checks are moved. In 1979, Federal
Reserve offices that processed checks
handled over 15.9 billion items. 22

Case IllustrationWire Notification of Dishonor
The issue of wire notification has been
decided in a number of cases dealing with
the midnight deadline, failure to comply
with the wire advice requirement, and
questions relating to potential bank liability. In Nassau Trust Co. '0. Banker's Trust
Co.,v a payor bank gave timely notice of
dishonor but was not excused from liability because the bank failed to return the
check before the "midnight deadline." In
Nassau, the court stated that under 12
e.F.R. S210.2:
A paying bank that receives a cash
item from or through a Federal
Reserve Bank ... and that pays or
remits for such item ... shall have the
right to recover any payment or remittance so made, if before it has finally
paid the item, it returns the item
before midnight of its banking day
next following the banking day of re•
celpt
.... 24
The defendant suggested that wire notice
of dishonor was sufficient. However, the

"a payor bank is
·responsible for giving
notice of
dzs·honor ... "

court deferred to operating letters issued
by the Federal Reserve Bank, thereby
showing support for Regulation J. The
court in Nassau relied on the holding in

Coloyado Nat'/ Bank '0. First Nat'l Bank and
Trust CO.2S which stated that "wire advice" is not a substitute or alternative to a
return of any item. Therefore, under 12
e.F .R. § 210.12(c), a payor bank is responsible for giving notice of dishonor by providing notice to the depository bank, and
returning the item unpaid prior to the
midnight deadline.
In Bank of Wyandotte '0. Woodrow,26 an
action was brought by the depository
bank, Bank of Wyandotte, against the drawer, Woodrow, who had stopped payment of his check given to plaintiff's
customer. Woodrow counterclaimed
agaiDst the Bank of Wyandotte for delay in

communicating wired advice of nonpayment of a separate check drawn on it
which was payable to Woodrow. The
court's holding stated that the Bank of
Wyandotte might potentially be liable to
Woodrow for the delay, however, no loss
was found to have resulted from such
delay. The court added, that if the bank
had wired advice before the midnight
deadline, notification would not have
reached Woodrow until the following day,
and in these exact circumstances such
action would not have prevented the loss
incurred by Woodrow. However, in some
cases the Bank may not be liable for failing
to wire advice of nonpayment as required
. by § 210.12(cX1). Where the Bank had not
received notice of nonpayment from the
bank to which the check had been sent by
the Bank and from which the check was
returned as missent, the bank will not be
liable for failure to comply with the wire
advice requirement. 27
In Security Bank and Trust Co. '0. Federal
Nat'/ Bank and Trust CO.,21 a Federal
Reserve operating letter requiring a payor
bank to wire notice of nonpayment of any
item of $2,500 or more, received from a
Federal Reserve bank for payment, was
held to be an agreement under U.e.e. S4103. It was held that the agreement altered
U.c.e. § 4-301 for timeliness of dishonor.
Factually, in Security Bank, the payor bank
which received delivery of a check on
Saturday and gave wire notice of dishonor
of the check before midnight of the following Tuesday, did give notice of dishonor before the U.e.e. § 4-301 midnight
deadline. However, the court held that the
agreement between the banks altered the
V.c.e. provisions requiring "written
notice of dishonor."29 Thus the petitioner
prevailed.
Liability to Remote Parties
Other cases have dealt with Bankliability to remote parties. The collection aspect
of Regulation J declares that the Bank shall
not have, nor assume, any liability of the
sender with respect to any item, except for
lack of good faith or failure to exercise
ordinary care.30 This regulation also
defines "sender" as "a member bank, a
nonmember clearing bank, a Federal
Reserve Bank, an international organization, or a foreign correspondent."31 In

Colonial Cadi/lac '0. Shawmut Merchant's
Bank,32 the federal district court for
Massachusetts, applied the provisions of
the Regulation J. 33 The court held that the
Bank is not liable for delayed notice of d~
honor to the nonbank payee of a draft that
was sent by the payee's bank for collection
to the Bank. The court stated that the
Bank was not liable to the payee because
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that party was not a "sender" under Regulation J. In a similar case, the federal 5th
circuit held that the Bank was not liable to
the payee-depositor of a check for alleged
negligence in collecting the check, which
consisted of failing to give timely notice of
return and failing to make reasonable attempts to collect the amount of the
check.34 In Childs v. Federal Reserve
Bank,35 the court applied 12 e.F.R. §
210.6{a)(1) stating that the Bank owed no
duty to the owner of the item who had
deposited the item in view of the lack of
agency status. Childs examined the power
of the Federal Reserve System Board of
Governors, under 12 U.S.e. § 248(i), to
carry out and perform its check collection
and clearinghouse functions. The court
concluded that Regulation J severs the
agency relationship between a reserve
bank and the owner of an item in the collection process.
In Appliance Buyer's Credit Corp. v. Pro·
spect Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 36 the court examined the timeliness of wire notice and
the liability of the Bank in relation to the
U.e.e., while illustrating the application
of variation of agreement between Federal
Reserve regulations and the U .e.e. In
Appliance Buyers, a depository bank failed
to give timely notice of dishonor of two
checks that had been sent through the
Bank to a payor bank. The Bank proceeded to dishonor the item. The court held
that the depositor had to show a loss or
damage resulting from the failure to give
timely notice. Thus, the court ruled that
the rule for damages for delay under
U.e.e. § 4-212(1) was measured by
U.e.e. § 4-103(5). More importantly, the
court concluded that besides application of
the U.e.e. for damages, the owner of the
item could not maintain an action against
the Bank for negligent handling because 12
e.F.R. § 210.2(e) states that the Bank does
not act as the agent for the owner, but onlyon behalf of the sender of the item.
Although application of U.e.e. § 4-202(3)
would conflict this holding, the court applied U.e.e. § 4-103 providing for the
modification of the U.e.e. sections by
Regulation J. Thus, the court limited the
liability of the reserve banks by excluding
all remote parties from obtaining damages
directly from reserve banks for their alleged negligence in collection.
Interaction between Regulation J and
Uniform Commercial Code; Variation
of Agreements - U.C.C. § 4-103
Because, the Federal Reserve regulations,
operating letters, and clearinghouse rules
have the effect of agreements, whether or
not assented to, a variety of cases have arisen which illustrate application of the Fed-

eral Reserve regulations and the U.e.e. 12
e.F.R. § 210.3(b) clearly states that rules
for collecting items and settling balances in
the collections of checks, under Regulation J, are binding on all banks in the collection process with respect to any item
that they have handled, which have been
presented or forwarded by a Bank. One example where the Federal Reserve Board
regulations have taken precedent is in the
area of non-member banks. Although one
may argue that non-member banks should
enjoy the privilege of escaping the regulatory arm of the Federal Reserve System,
the courts have ruled that Regulation J
governs the collection of checks and other

"Regulation]
governs . . .
co llection ... by
member and nonmember banks."

items by member and non-member banks.
In Community Bank v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 37 the Court of Appeals held that
U.e.e. § 4-103(2) bound non-member
banks to the 1972 amendments to Regulation J. The regulation required settlement
in immediately available funds and also advanced the time within which the payor
bank must settle checks. This regulation
directly conflicted with the practice of settlement by draft on another bank allowable under U.e.e. § 4-211. The argument
in Community Bank was that the Federal
Reserve Board could not amend the
U.e.e. The court in focusing on the time
and manner of the collection of the checks
prior to and after adoption of Regulation
J stated:
Prior to the amendments, payor banks
became accountable if they failed to
settle for demand items before midnight of the banking day of receipt,
and settlements made earlier could be
revoked prior to the midnight
deadline. The amendments to Regulation J advance the settlement time to
the close of the banking day of receipt,
and only if settlement is made prior to
this time may it be revoked before
midnight of the banking day of re-

ceipt. The amendments also affect the
manner in which settlement may be
made by eliminating drafts drawn on
other banks as permissible forms of
settlement. 38
The court reasoned that speeding up the
process enables the Bank to pass earlier
credit to the depositor bank, thereby reducing float. Clearly, § 210.9(a) (1) of Regulation J makes the payor bank
accountable if it fails to settle for demand
items before the close of its banking day of
receipt. Although there was a clear conflict
between the California law and the Federal Reserve regulations, the court reconciled this problem by applying U.e.e. §
4-103(1), which provided for the variation
of agreements, and U.e.e. § 4-103(2), stating that, "Federal Reserve regulations and
operating letters, clearing house rules, and
the like, have the effect of agreements ...
whether or not specifically assented to by
all parties interested in the items handled."
Agreements that can be made between
the respective banks will be observed as
binding under U.e.e. § 4-103, however,
only in some instances has the defense of
variation of agreements between banks
been validated. In Catalina Yachts v. Old
Colony Bank and Trust CO./9 the court examined an agreement entered into by a
Federal Reserve Bank, a payor bank, and a
Federal Reserve member bank, acting as a
correspondent bank for the non-member
payor bank. The checks were drawn on
the payor bank and cleared through the
Federal Reserve Bank. The checks were
picked up each day by the corresponding
bank, processed by the same bank's computer on that day, and delivered to the
payor bank on the following banking day.
The agreement between the non-member
payor bank and the correspondent bank
altered the provisions of U.e.e. §4104(1)(h) and § 4-301 with respect to the
midnight deadline for the return of the unpaid items. The agreement, the court determined, was the type contemplated by
U.e.e. § 4-103, which authorizes such
agreements, thereby altering the provisions of the U.e.e.
However, in Kane v. American Nat'l
Bank and Trust CO.,40 the Federal Reserve
regulations and circulars were held to be
inapplicable because the collections of
items were not within the Federal Reserve
collection channels and therefore did not
relieve the payor bank of liability under
U.e.e. § 4-302. In Bank Leumi Trust Co.

of New York v. Bank of AfidJersey:1 a
payor bank failed to payor return the item
presented to it before the midnight
deadline because of pencil marks on the
check and an encoding error which made
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computer processing impossible. The
court held that subsequent reception by a
Bank, which failed to charge the bank's
account, and held the item past the midnight deadline, and accepted the payor's
bank's "Disclaimer of Late Return" did
not constitute a variance of the normal
V.e.e. §4 provisions, which displaced the
code provisions under § 4-103(2). The
court decided that the Bank's actions of
not charging the bank's account with the
amount of the check did not amount to a
regulation, operating letter or clearinghouse rule, but was merely a balancing of
the bank's books. Likewise, Yeiser 'V. Bank
of AdamS'lJille"2 decided the issue of a
payor's bank liability when a timely
return of a check for insufficient funds was
not accompanied by wire advice of nonpayment as required by the circular. 4J The
Yeiser cou.rt held that the Federal Reserve
requirement of "wire advice" was not intended as a substitute or alternative to the
return of the item, which under V.e.C. §
4-301 was the primary method of revoking
settlement. The court decided that the circular did not constitute an agreement
which varied the terms of V.e.e. § 4-301,
allowable under V.e.e. § 4-103(1) and

(2).
Problems
In Subpart A of Regulation J there are
still problems that increase the probability
of loss for both any bank and the Federal
Reserve System. First, float, which allows
the private sector to gain an asset (available
funds) in exchange for a non-interest asset
(a deposited check from which funds are
not available) must be decreased so the
Treasury does not have to raise large
amounts of revenue to replace the distributed funds.·· Hence, new amendments to
Regulation J to shorten collection and settlement time would reduce float.
,
Second, 12 e.F.R. § 210.12(c) (1) requires notification of nonpayment of an
item greater than $2,500, the previous level
was $1,000. Before the increase in the dollar limit, participation in the program was
approximately fifty percent, whereas present participation has decreased to only
thirty-five percent.· 5 Although there is a
labor problem in establishing this notification procedure, strict adherence would diminish the bank's exposure to risk of loss
while maintaining the high fiduciary duty
owed to both customers and stockholders.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In an effort to shorten the gap of time
before settlement of the item, Congress
has recently addressed a number of potential improvements to the check processing
system in the Competitive Equality Bank-

ing Act of 1987 ("CEBA"),46 § 609. The
instituting of methods to diminish the
time between the notice and return of the
item is prescribed in § 609(b)(3), which
calls for incentives to institutions to return
items more promptly, and in § 609(b)(4),
which suggests automated processing of
unpaid checks. Moving the deadline for
settlement forward is suggested by CEBA
in § 609(b)(6), which limits time to one
business day in the determination of
whether to pay the item. Sections 609(5),
(7), and (9) focus on the desire to clear
checks faster and make decisions regarding
payment of items within a shorter amount
of time by eliminating unnecessary endorsements, making all checks eligible to
be returned through the Federal Reserve
System, and permitting returned checks to
be forwarded to the receiving depository
institutions. Furthermore, a direct wire
notification coupled with the previously
mentioned sections of CEBA would lessen
the amount of float required due to the
shortened time periods of settlements between banks.
Another possible rectification of these
problems would be to redefine "sender" in
Regulation J so as to parallel the definition
in the V.e.e. The redefining would make
the bank liable to the owner of the item,
and would effectively overrule the Childs

"new amendments to
Regulation] ...
would reduce float."

decision. Additionally, new amendements
could be proposed that would unite the
regulation and the V.c.e. in an effort to
effectuate the goals of quicker notification
and diminished risk exposure.
Wire Transfer of Funds - Regulation J,
Subpart B
In electronic fund transfers the Federal
Reserve System expands Regulation J, by
establishing rules under which the reserve
banks could electronically accept and deliver both credit and debit transfers over
the national communication network.
During 1979, the Federal Reserve Wire

Network which is designed to handle substantial transfers and to discourage small
transfers, handled 35 million transactions
valued at $64 trillion dollars. The Federal
Reserve System's involvement in the transfer of a bank's reserve account, under 12
U.S.c. § 248, promulgated Subpart B to
Regulation J for the purpose of dealing
with the wire transfer of funds. Subpart B
sets forth the rights and obligations of
member banks and Federal Reserve Banks
in connection with the transfer of funds by
wire. Subpart B, similar to Subpart A, also
allows for the Bank to issue operating circulars to govern the details of transfer of
funds operationsY
Transfer of Funds Vnder the Federal
Reserve System - Regulation J, Subpart
B
Subpart B of Regulation J requires that
the Bank initially request the Federal
Reserve to collect an amount on the same
day as the request. The Federal Reserve
would immediately give the requesting
bank the requisite credit to its account,
and then use the communication network
to notify the commercial bank that a certain amount is to be collected, thereby
debiting the bank's reserve account. The
Federal Reserve has various systems for
different organizations under Subpart B:
Fedwire, Bank Wire, Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), Society
for Worldwide International Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT), and Clearing House Electronic Settlement System
(CHESS). With each system there are
three types of messages that are handled:
transfers of reserve account balances from
one member bank to another, transfers of
Vnited States government and federal
agency securities, and administrative and
research information. The transfer of
reserve account balances between member
banks deals with funds derived from the
purchasing and selling of federal funds,
funds from correspondent bank balances
and funds to other members on behalf of
the customer. When transfers are made to
the other member banks they may take
the form of purchasing or selling of commercial paper, bonds, securities, or could
be the replenishment of corporate demand
deposits.48 Requests can be made by telephone, while advice of the transaction is
made on the member banks' daily summary reserve statement. Each member bank
receives daily statements detailing the preceding day's reserve account activity. If the
transferor fails to object by written notification within ten calendar days after
notification of the debit, the debit is deemed approved by the transferor.· 9
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Case Illustration
In Delbrueck & Co. '0. Manufacturers Han·
over Trust Co., so the court dealt with the
responsibility of banks to their customers
in executing fund transfers ordered by
telex or cable. In Delbrueck. the German
banking partnership, Delbrueck & Company, telex-ordered its New York bank,
Manufacturers Hanover, to transfer $12.5
million to the account of Herstaat at
Chase Manhattan Bank, for the following
day. The transfer order was released by
Manufacturers through the CHIPS system
six minutes after an office in another part
of Manufacturers learned of the Herstaat
failure earlier that morning. The next
twenty-four hours were characterized by a
flurry of messages between Delbrueck and
the two New York banks. Delbrueck sued
to recover from Manufacturers for its negligence in the handling of the matter. The
court held that there was insufficient time
to act on the information received six
minutes before the transfer between Manufacturers and Delbrueck. Compounded
by Delbrueck's telexing Manufacturers regarding another transfer, the court held
Delbrueck contributorily negligent, requiring Delbrueck to share with Manufacturers equally in the responsibility for
actions taken and not taken.
Problems
Although the electronic fund transfer
would aid in accelerating collection and
settlement of items, at the same time the
system has created some problems. Security and error problems could be created by
"computer criminals." Through the use of
computers and financial sheets, computer
oriented criminals would be able to abscond with a sizeable amount of money
and then reprogram the computer to erase
any tracks made by the criminal. Further
problems arise if banks implement electronic processing and transmitting of
checks by using high-speed impulses of
computer communication systems instead
of checking the back of each check for signature similarities. This causes the dilemma of how a computer will be able to
detect a counterfeit electronic impulse as
opposed to a signature.
Besides possible malfunctioning, there
are antitrust questions concerning access
and participation in deciding whether
thrift institutions, credit unions, or corporations should have direct access. How to
set standards and formats covering the
exchange of magnetic tape or other information carried at the automated clearinghouse is yet to be determined. Another
dilemma concerns the cost of exchanging
data and similar information. Finally, the

unresolved question of the development of
customer indemnification agreements,
price fixing and uniform services still remains unresolved. sl In dealing with the
malfunctions and antitrust problems certain areas can be handled by the V.e.e.:
(1) Fixing of responsibility for MICR
printing or encoding errors; (2) errors
or omissions in full line rehabilitation
ofMICR check rejects or return items;
(3) electronic communication or processing incidents, such as: (a) omissions
or failure to carry out instructions, (b)
time limits for reporting errors in
bank statements, (c) no return or paid
items, (d) definition of item to include
electronic debits and credits, (e) errors
in telecommunication of related information, and (t) validation of instructions, etc.; (4) fraud-proof identification of user and authority for the
electronic debit order; (5) protection
of the customer's right of privacy; and
(6) those incidental to the long transition period when both paper and
paperless electronic processing will be
used .... 52
Regarding potential computer crimes there
are violent crimes against computer
systems, robbery or assault of users, insider crime, unauthorized use, and theft of
valuable computer-stored assetsY
Conclusions and Recommendations
In an effort to reduce the potential for
loss involved in the electronic movement
of money, the Federal Reserve Board has
taken several positive steps. In 1982, the

Uelectronic fund
transfer would aid in
accelerating
collection and
settlement of
items . .. "
Federal Reserve Board established the Federal Advisory Council/Thrift Institutions
Advisory Council Payments Systems
Committee to consider the issue of payment system risk. In 1983, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
adopted a uniform procedures manual for
the examination of fund transfer

actIVItieS of depository institutions on
large-dollar wire transfer network. This
new procedure is designed to disclose deficiencies in the internal credit and operational controls of those institutions
participating on the Federal Reserve networks. In 1984, CHIPS imposed a maximum amount of net payments it would
accept from each of the other participants
over CHIPS.
The previously discussed Federal
Reserve System measures attempt to cover
all possible entrances and exits into and
out of the computer. The regulation and
constant surveillance of the wire network
could initially deter potential abusers of
the system until a better method can be
employed. Although there is a statute that
sets forth the duties and responsibilities of
the parties, further work should be done
in monitoring the methods of these transfers through the electronic network. A
new security system of some type would
best serve the field of electronic transfers.
Additionally, more case law in the above
area would also aid in the interpretation of
Subpart B of Regulation J because the
trend of legislatures and courts is that wire
transfers are not governed by the U.e.e. 54
Thus, further court determination as to
the application and ramifications of Subpart B will clearly outline and define Subpart B of Regulation J, so to firmly set its
effects and expected results.
Summary
Analysis of Regulation J through Subparts A, check collection and processing,
and Subpart B, electronic transfer of funds,
indicates that there are still problems that
must be addressed to decrease the risk of
loss which the Federal Reserve Bank exposes itself to in its everyday activities. To
shorten the time gap, and thereby allow
earlier notification and decrease the
amount of float the Treasury is asked to
provide, a legal restructuring of check collection and subsequent transfer of funds is
suggested. One answer to these problems
would be the creation of a new Uniform
Commercial Code provision, specifically
designed to provide a legal structure of
clearly defined general rules to govern the
various relationships of the parties to
paperless entries and electronic payment
transactions between Federal Reserve
Banks and non-member banks. The obvious advantage would be one productive
endeavor as opposed to an attempt to add
patches and sectionalized amendments to
the rules. Promulgation of patchwork
rules designed for the paper based negotiable instrument payment mechanism has
started to occur as evidenced by the Competitive Equality Bank Act of 1987. Rather
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than having the U.c.c. govern check
processing and collection by electronic
fund transfers, perhaps a better alternative
would be the establishment of such a
system by contract as designed by the parties. At present, the relationship between
the bank and its customers under the Uniform Commercial Code, superseded in
pan by application of Regulation J, creates
unnecessary problems that can be avoided
by uniform procedures among all parties.
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